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Abstract
The paper studies the way economic turmoils influence the lay agents’ predictions of
macroeconomic fundamentals. The recent economic crises have, in fact, led several au-
thors to challenge the standard macroeconomic view that all agents are Muth-rational,
hence omniscient and homogeneous, forecasters. In this paper lay agents are assumed
to be heterogeneous in their predictive ability. Heterogeneity is modeled by assum-
ing that people have equal loss functions, but different asymmetry parameters. The
adopted methodological tools are grounded in the standard Operational Research the-
ory. Specifically, we develop a dynamic stochastic optimization problem, which is solved
by performing extensive Monte Carlo simulations. Results show that the less sophis-
ticated forecasters in our setting – the medians – never perform as muthians and that
second best (SB) agents do that only occasionally. This regardless the size of the crisis.
Thus, as in the real world, in our artificial economy heterogeneity is a structural trait.
More intriguingly, simulations also show that the medians’ behavior tend to be rela-
tively smoother than that of SB agents, and that the difference between them widens in
the case very serious crises. In particular, great recessions make SB agents’ predictions
relatively more biased. An explanation is that dramatic crises extend the available
information set (e.g., due to greater mass media coverage), and this leads SB agents,
who are more attentive to revise their forecasts than medians. The point is that more
information does not necessarily mean better forecasting performances. All considered,
thus, our simulations suggest a rewording of Ackoff’s famous phrase: it is not silly to
not look for an optimal solution to a mess.
Keywords: Dynamic stochastic optimization model, economic crisis, forecasting, heteroge-
neous agents, Monte Carlo simulations.
1 Introduction
Expectations of future events play a prominent role in economic decision making. Con-
sumers must think about the type of house to buy, the amount of education to pursue, the
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fraction of income to save, etc. Firms must decide where to locate factories and offices,
what products to develop and produce, etc.
Standard macroeconomic theory describes economic decisions as the result of optimizing
behavior of omniscient ”Muth-rational” agents (Muth, 1961). Muth-rational expectations
are a collection of assumptions regarding the manner in which economic agents exploit
available information to form their expectations. In its stronger forms, rational expecta-
tions operate as a coordination device that permits the construction of a representative
agent having representative expectations. Though homogeneous rational expectations are
still very commonly assumed in macroeconomics, recently the study of heterogeneous beliefs
has been gaining momentum in the literature. This for two main reasons.
First, differences in agents’ beliefs play an important role in macroeconomic analysis. For
instance, heterogeneity in predictions has been offered as an explanation for why mone-
tary policy shocks can have real and persistent effects on output growth due to i) limited
capacity for processing information (Reis, 2006 and 2009), Mackowiak and Wiederholt,
2009), ii) infrequent updating of beliefs (Mankiw and Reis, 2002) or iii) slow aggregate
learning arising from dispersed information (Lorenzoni, 2009). Mixed beliefs may also stem
for other reasons. Since the theoretical work of Brock and Hommes (1997), many authors
have examined the benefit of including predictor choice as an economic decision in models
with expectations formation (Chiarella and Khomin, 1999). Especially in the short run,
then, different models may generate different predictions. Nonetheless, by examining GDP
dynamics Bovi (2013) finds that, over a time-span of two decades, an easy-to-perform adap-
tive expectations model systematically outperforms other standard predictors. Though this
should reduce model uncertainty and thereby lead to increased homogeneity in expecta-
tions, data collected in surveys show that great variety in expectations persists even in this
situation. In our setting Bovi’s findings are important because they support the notion of
the enduring presence of disperse beliefs, in line with the real-world situation. According
to Curtin (2008), then, lay people may be interested in knowing about how inflation affects
their shopping trolley, or the unemployment rate in their specific labor market, but are less
interested in learning about the performance of the whole country or in aggregated macro
indicators which are difficult to apply to their daily life. Reis (2006, 2009) interprets this
kind of finding arguing that costs associated with the acquisition and use of information
may generate ”rational inattention”.
Second, the recent worldwide economic crisis has likely impinged on individuals’ predictive
ability and, accordingly, on the degree of consensus on expected macroeconomic dynamics
– different forecasting performances imply disperse beliefs and vice versa. In this regard,
theoretical models (e.g., van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp, 2006) suggest that macroeco-
nomic uncertainty and dispersion in beliefs should be greater during recessions. Patton and
Timmermann (2010) show supporting evidence of that. Moreover, a better understanding
of this kind of heterogeneity can help elaborate sharper tests of macroeconomic models for
which subjective beliefs are a driver of economic activity. Though the literature focusing on
the prediction of financial crises is flourishing (e.g., Niemira and Saaty, 2004; Sevim et al.,
2014), much less effort has been made to examine the impact of bad economic conditions
on agents’ predictive performance.
In this context, the focus of our work – and intended contribution – is to examine the
effects of deteriorated macroeconomic conditions on agents’ forecasting performances. The
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fundamental that agents must predict in these economic periods is the GDP growth rate1.
Specifically, our economic environment is populated by agents featured by different predic-
tive ability caused by disparate attentiveness and/or information sets. Following Capistran
and Timmermann (2009), we synthesize this kind of heterogeneity by the asymmetry pa-
rameter – namely, θ – of LINEX loss functions.
We focus on three (groups of) individuals performing reiterate forecasting exercises.
The first cluster is made up by ”muthians”, which are equipped with symmetric – i.e.: θ = 0
– LINEX loss functions. They are the benchmark forecasters because they are objectively
optimal. The term ”objectively optimal” captures the main feature of the muthian agent: it
commits (optimal) errors with zero mean (McAllister, 1991). Borrowing from the standard
macroeconomic theory, we also hypothesize that there is a bijection between zero-mean-
errors agents and muthian ones.
Then, we study ”second best” (SB) forecasters, who are able to minimize the distance be-
tween their asymmetric loss functions and that of the muthian. The reason for being SB
agents can be in the lack of sufficient information and/or the agents’ inability to perform at
any time as good as the omniscient muthian. SB agents may be though of as expert and/or
professional forecasters such as, e.g., econometricians.
Lastly, we examine ”median” forecasters. This last cluster is obtained by considering the
median of the empirical distribution of the distances between asymmetric and muthian loss
functions. Hence, median forecasters can be thought of as agents that structurally follow
neither muthian’s rationality nor its opposite. Similarly to what said to explain the dif-
ference between SB and muthian agents, median and second best forecasters are different
because the former have not sufficient skill/information/attention to perform at any time
as good as the latter. Medians may be meant as na¨ıve decision makers using rule-of-thumb
and/or heuristics (Kahneman, and Tversky, 1974; Bovi, 2009).
We analyze these three (groups of) agents in two alternative bad macroeconomic environ-
ments: one only moderately unfavorable, the other much more depressed. The logic is
that there is a relationship between the magnitude of the crisis and the agents’ forecasting
performance. In fact, a well established stylized fact suggests that the more severe the
recession, the greater the GDP growth rate volatility. This is not the end of the story, how-
ever, because the level of GDP volatility magnifies the level of the forecast error. The basic
logic of this latter sequence is easy to understand: a constant is obviously much simpler to
forecast than a highly volatile variable (see also Dietz, 2012).
The current crisis may be thought of as a sort of natural experiment to understand how
lay decision makers react to very dramatic years. In particular, due to its terrible recent
downturn, Greece is one of the most suitable cases, raising the following question: How do
Greeks perceive their own personal financial situation with respect to that of their coun-
try? Clearly, the representative citizen cannot by definition systematically drift apart from
that of the country where she lives, given that the nation-wide economic situation is the
(weighted) sum of the individual ones in the country. Yet, it may be hard to remain objec-
tive in the course of very deep and prolonged economic crises (Ackoff, 1997).
A unique dataset from the European Commission helps us digging into individuals’ per-
ceptions on economic situations. The dataset is based on monthly surveys from the Joint
Harmonised EU Programme of Business and Consumer Surveys (European Commission,
2007). These surveys aim at capturing the representative Greek response. Each month
1Other challenging questions can be addressed by examining some financial variables such as stock prices
and returns, volumes, and the like (see e.g.: Chiarella and He, 2001; Consiglio and Russino, 2007). However,
our research interest is to explore the expectations formation process on real macroeconomic fundamentals.
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respondents answered, among others, the following two questions: ”How do you expect the
financial position of your household to change over the next 12 months?” and ”How do you
expect the general economic situation in the country to develop over the next 12 months?”
The responses are summarized in two indexes, one for each question, varying between +100
(all respondents answer ”It is getting a lot better”) and -100 (all respondents answer ”It is
getting a lot worse”).
Figure 1 shows the squared difference between the two indexes since 1985.
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
Caption: Squared difference between the indices which summarize the answers of the
Greek citizens to the following two questions: ”How do you expect the financial position
of your household to change over the next 12 months?” and ”How do you expect the
general economic situation in the country to develop over the next 12 months?”.
Responses vary between +100 (all respondents answer ”It is getting a lot better”) and
-100 (all respondents answer ”It is getting a lot worse”). The considered period is 1985M1
- 2013M7.
Evidence as clearly as astonishingly shows that, hit by the sovereign debt crisis started in
2008, month-after-month for nearly two years, there was an unprecedented level of decou-
pling between the Greeks’ predictions of their own and their nation’s economic destiny. We
interpret this persistent misalignment between Greeks and Greece as supporting evidence
that greater political and economic turbulence makes it harder to maintain objectivity. In
turn, it may imply that during great recessions i) decision makers could behave less opti-
mally than in less extreme cyclical phases and that ii) heterogeneity may become wider. In
this paper we try to shed some light on this kind of issues.
Based on the above as well as on the existing evidence (Aizenman and Pinto, 2005), we
assume that the level of macroeconomic volatility increases with the gravity of the turmoil.
To learn the effects of deteriorated economic conditions on agents’ forecasting exercises
we develop a stochastic dynamic optimization problem. From the methodological point of
view, our paper belongs and intends to add to the field of the optimal control theory. The
reader can find a complete survey of deterministic mathematical control theory in Bardi
and Capuzzo Dolcetta (1997). The stochastic framework is described in Borkar (1989),
Fleming and Soner (1993), Krylov (1980), Yong and Zhou (1999). In general, according
to some authors, optimization theory is a particularly useful tool for doing macroeconomic
analysis (see e.g. Engels, 1992; Woodford, 2009; Consiglio and Staino, 2012). Modeling of
economic crises based on the optimization theory and operations research has already been
done by some scholars in a number of different frameworks. To cite only a few: Kirby (2007)
deals with the relationships between confidence in operations research and economic tur-
bulence; Bayram et al. (2014) develop a stochastic integer program to detect the strategies
of the so-called community development corporations, non-governmental/nonprofit entities
contrasting the crisis in the U.S. by investing in foreclosed properties. Rios-Rull (2001) is
somewhat closer to our paper in that he deals with the assessment the relationship between
business cycle and heterogeneity of beliefs by developing dynamic optimization models. The
main aim of the present study, however, is the way poor macroeconomic performances affect
lay people’s predictions of real GDP dynamics.
From the operative standpoint, we present a constrained minimization problem where the
objective function is the distance between the muthian’s loss function and the asymmetric
one. The problem is solved with respect to time-dependent asymmetry parameters θ’s (the
”control variables”). These latter actually control the objective function and the dynamics
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of the errors (the ”state variable”, describing the evolution of the system). The control vari-
ables belong to a specific functional space (the ”admissible region”). The adopted solution
strategy for the optimal control problem is to implement extensive Monte Carlo simula-
tions. In doing this, we are in line with a wide strand of the literature (see e.g. Cao et al.,
2003; Barone et al., 2012; Cerqueti and Quaranta, 2012; Blueschke et al., 2013, Castellano
and Cerqueti, 2013, 2014). By adopting such a solution strategy, two targets are achieved:
i) providing a more intuitive discussion of the economic sense of the optimal solution; ii)
maintaining the theoretical model as general as possible, avoiding restrictive mathematical
assumptions by making its quantitative treatment possible.
Simulations show intriguing patterns, shedding some light on how the asymmetry param-
eters – i.e. the agents’ predictive ability – vary according to the seriousness of the crisis.
First, SB agents can succeed in forecasting as good as muthians. As expected, however, this
happens only occasionally and never happens for medians. Therefore, our artificial economy
is able to capture the structural heterogeneity characteristic of the real world. The less so-
phisticated forecasters’ θ’s tend to follow relatively smoother paths than the second best’s
ones. This holds regardless of the size of the crisis. The detected less-schizoid behavior
may mirror the fact that, by definition, medians have less-than-optimal forecasting ability
and/or attention and/or lower information than SB individuals. Accordingly, they are less
prone or prompt to seek and exploit new information and to significantly revise their beliefs.
Moreover, the SB forecaster tend to stay as close as possible to Muth-rationality and turbu-
lence tends to enlarge muthians’ forecasting errors. In fact, another remarkable finding of
our simulations is that our agents are relatively more similar during mild economic periods,
while behaving very differently during periods of economic turmoils. In particular, it seems
that major crises lead only SB agents to adopt a sort of bang-bang behavior. An expla-
nation is that very serious crises broaden the information set – e.g., due to greater mass
media coverage – possibly leading SB agents to substantially revise their the forecasts, since
they are the ones who are more prone to rapidly take into account any new information.
The problem with this beliefs reshuﬄe is that, as emphasized by Doms and Morin (2004),
the media tend to emphasize bad economic news. Whilst this pertains to the natural ap-
proach of the media to the news, Blendon et al. (1997) have pointed out that the public’s
biases can be attributed to the media’s focus on bad news (see also Bovi, 2009). From this
perspective, many years ago Simon (1971) stressed that a wealth of information creates a
poverty of attention. Hence, more information neither necessarily mean better information
nor better forecasting performances. All in all, thus, our simulations suggest a rewording
of Ackoff’s famous phrase: it is not silly to not look for an optimal solution to a mess.
The rest of paper is organized as follows: the next Section contains the main ingredients
of the model and the formalization of the optimization problem. Section 3 describes the
Monte Carlo procedure employed to solve the optimization problem. Section 4 lists and
discusses the obtained results. Concluding remarks close the paper. The pseudo-codes of
the simulations are reported in the Appendix.
2 The Model
We introduce a filtered probability space (Ω,F , {Ft}t≥0,P) which contains the random
quantities of the model.
The economic environment is populated by a group of heterogeneous agents, who are as-
sumed to operate in a period characterized by a negative cyclical phase. GDP dynamics
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at time t will be denoted as ft, while the evolution of agents’ beliefs on GDP growth is
collected in
{f˜t}t≥0 =
{(
f˜
(i)
t
)
i=1,...,N
}
t∈N
.
Each agent forecasts the rate of change of the GDP and tries to maintain her/his forecasts
in line with the actual rate of change in a sense that will be cleared later on. Agents’ beliefs
evolve deterministically according to a controlled difference equation:
f˜t = f˜t−1 + β(f˜t, θt), (1)
where:
• the N -variate stochastic process
{θt}t∈N =
{(
θ
(i)
t
)
i=1,...,N
}
t∈N
describes the heterogeneity among agents. For each i = 1, . . . , N and t ∈ N, the
value θ(i)t represents the asymmetric parameter at time t of the LINEX cost function
employed by the agent i to perform predictions (for the definition of the LINEX cost
function, see the next section). The functional space Θ is the admissible region, and
it is defined as follows:
Θ :=
{
θ(i) : [0,+∞)× Ω→ R {Ft} − adapted processes
}
. (2)
• β : RN × RN → RN , where
β(f˜t, θt) =
(
βi(f˜
(i)
t , θ
(i)
t )
)
i=1,...,N
;
• βi is a continuous real value bounded function with respect to the process θ(i)t , for
each i = 1, . . . , N ;
• f˜0 ∈ RN is the deterministic initial value of the dynamics described in (1).
On the basis of standard economic evidence, we assume that the variance of the real GDP
is affected by the severity of the occurring economic crisis. To formalize this hypothesis, we
introduce the negativity level of the business cycle at time t through an aggregated index
αt ∈ [−1, 0), which is assumed to collect all the available information related to the entity
of the crisis and to work as follows: fixed t ∈ N, the lower the value of αt, the more severe
the negativity level of the business cycle. The specific case of αt ∼ 0− means that crisis is
not so deep, and the economy is stagnant.
GDP dynamics is hypothesized to be driven by a stochastic difference equation:
ft = ft−1 + µf (ft) + σf (ft, αt)², t > 0, (3)
where:
• µf : R→ R;
• σf : R× [−1, 0)→ [0,+∞) ;
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• ² ∼ N(0, 1) is a standard normal random variable.
We assume that the initial value of the rate of change of the GDP, f0, is deterministic and,
as such, it is known. Moreover, there is widespread evidence that the GDP is more volatile
in periods of recession than when the GDP growth is close to zero. Hence, at time t, σf is
reasonably assumed to be increasing with respect to |αt|.
We define the state-variable
{xt}t∈N =
{(
x
(i)
t
)
i=1,...,N
}
t∈N
=
{(
ft − f˜ (i)t
)
i=1,...,N
}
t∈N
whose evolution, given (3) and (1) is given by:
xt − xt−1 =
(
µi(x
(i)
t , θ
(i)
t ) + σ(x
(i)
t , αt)²
)
i=1,...,N
, t > 0 (4)
where:
• µi
(
x
(i)
t , θ
(i)
t
)
= µf (ft)− βi(f˜ (i)t , θ(i)t );
• σ(x(i)t , αt) = σf (ft, αt);
• x0 =
(
x(i)
)
i=1,...,N
is the deterministic starting point of the dynamics {xt}t∈N.
For each i = 1, . . . , N , functions µi and σi and their arguments are assumed to satisfy
the usual regularity conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the solution for the i-th
equation with initial data introduced in (4).
2.1 The optimization problem
We assume that agents perform their forecasting exercises simultaneously and that there is
no imitative nor strategic behavior. It is worth recalling that the heterogeneity across our
agents is due to their different level of skills and/or information and/or attention. Each
agent has the same loss function, which is minimized with respect to the errors x’s to perform
the forecasting exercise. Specifically, agent i aims at minimizing her/his loss function by
appropriately selecting her/his asymmetry parameter.
Following the literature (Capistran and Timmermann, 2009; Pesaran and Weale, 2006) as
loss function we use the LINEX (see Varian, 1975). This cost function is widely adopted
in the literature dealing with expectations on macroeconomic fundamentals because, in
the extreme case, asymmetric loss permits forecasters to be muthian, i.e. fully-informed
optimal, forecasters while still accounting for the empirical observation that forecasters
”disagree”, provided that their loss functions exhibit different degrees of asymmetry. In
addition, the LINEX is widely adopted because Capistran and Timmermann (2007) show
that one can obtain essentially the same conclusions in the case of a general asymmetric
loss function, provided only weak restrictions are put on the form of that loss function and
the data-generating process (DGP). The requirement of the DGP is that the variable of
interest is conditionally location scale distributed, and the requirement of the loss function
is that it is homogeneous in the forecast error. Therefore, the LINEX allows capturing the
presence of asymmetry, which is not the case for other functions such as the quadratic and
the log. Finally, it is worth noting that the quadratic loss function is a particular case of
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the LINEX with θ = 0, as easily seen in the symmetric case of the following eq. (5)).
Our LINEX is L : R2 → R such that:
L(x(i)t , θ
(i)
t ) =

E
{
1h
θ
(i)
t
i2 · [exp(θ(i)t · x(i)t )− θ(i)t · x(i)t − 1]
}
, for θ(i)t 6= 0;
E
{[
x
(i)
t
]2}
, for θ(i)t = 0,
(5)
where E represents the usual expected value operator, θ(i)t is the asymmetric loss parameters
at time t of the agent i, and its sign describes the asymmetry property of L associated to
the i-th agent. When θ(i)t > 0 (θ
(i)
t < 0), then the loss function increases with respect to x
(i)
t
when x(i)t > 0 (x
(i)
t < 0) and decreases otherwise. As θ
(i)
t approaches 0, then the LINEX
function approaches the symmetric case L(x(i)t , 0) = E
{[
x
(i)
t
]2}
.
In our setting, agents are able to change the asymmetry parameter of their loss function at
each time t.
Remark 1. If θ(i)t = 0, then the forecaster will have errors with zero mean. In fact, we
have:
min
x
(i)
t ∈R
L(x(i)t , 0) = min
x
(i)
t ∈R
E
{[
x
(i)
t
]2}
= 0,
if and only if E
{
x
(i)
t
}
= 0.
In this case, we refer to the muthian agent at time t. Muthian agent has a complete infor-
mative set and full ability to exploit such information.
Of course, when the dynamics of the errors in (4) is such that E
{
x
(i)
t
}
6= 0, then the
forecaster cannot be muthian at time t.
The optimization problem aims at searching for the agent who is the second best fore-
caster, according to the following definition.
Definition 1. Fix t = 1, 2, . . . , and consider two agents i1, i2 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}. Agent i1
performs better than agent i2 at time t if and only if∣∣∣L(x(i1)t , θ(i1)t )− L(x(i1)t , 0)∣∣∣ < ∣∣∣L(x(i2)t , θ(i2)t )− L(x(i2)t , 0)∣∣∣.
Definition 1 formalizes the fact that the second best forecaster is closer – w.r.t. the
median – to the muthian agent of Remark 1.
To sum up, the selection of the second best forecaster is achieved through the solution of
the following optimization problem:
inf
θ
(i)
t ∈R
∣∣∣L(x(i)t , θ(i)t )− L(x(i)t , 0)∣∣∣, ∀t ∈ N. (6)
3 Monte Carlo simulation results
The optimization problem formalized in the previous Section is solved through extensive
Monte Carlo simulations. As we shall see, the strategy is to implement a grid-search on a
large number of θ’s. In this section we present the dataset and the definition of the variables
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employed for the simulation procedures. Results and the related discussion are contained
in Sections 4 and 5.
In agreement with standard approaches (Elliott, et al. 2005; Capistran and Timmer-
mann, 2009; Clements, 2009, 2014), we chose a multi-period forecasting horizon. This
choice is also driven by the scope of enabling useful comparisons across our artificial agents
through forward-looking decisions, still allowing potentially biased results. This aspect is
relevant for our main aim. Thus, we consider T ∈ N such that t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , T , and
set T = 19, and δ = 0.03. We also let the initial datum of the GDP dynamics vary as
f0 = −0.025 : 0.003 : −0.001. Moreover, it is assumed f0 = f˜0, so that the initial error is
x0 = 0.
The selected value of the parameter ρ comes out from a calibration on the basis of the quar-
terly growth rate of the real GDP for Italy. In particular, ρ is equal to the 1992Q1-2014Q1
average of the above mentioned macroeconomic fundamental. Hence, we pose ρ = 0.0016.
As already said, we pay specific attention to two bad economic environments: one moder-
ately bad and a much more deteriorated one. To offer a more intuitive interpretation of
the results, we also remove the dependence of α on time. Hence, we fix αt = α, for each
t = 1, . . . , T , and set α = αd, αm, with −1 ≤ αd << αm < 0. The parameters αd, αm
capture the cases of ”deteriorated” and ”moderately bad” cyclical phase, respectively. As-
signing a value to the α’s is unnecessary. Indeed, the action of α impinges only on the
diffusion coefficient σf of the dynamics of {ft}t≥0 as written in equation (3). By following
the hypotheses on σf , we set
σf (ft, αd) = 0.4 · ft, σf (ft, αm) = 0.01 · ft.
The deterministic term of equation (3) is set to
µf (ft) = ρft.
Function βi in (1) must be defined in order to let the deterministic trend of the real and of
the forecasted GDP be the same in case of muthian agent. Hence, we select it as follows:
βi(f˜
(i)
t , θ
(i)
t ) =
ρ
1 + θ(i)t
· f˜ (i)t . (7)
To perform the grid search, we have generated a large number of synthetic agents. To this
end, we have extracted (J−3)×T random numbers from an uniform distribution U(−2, 2).
To be sure to include some cases of interest, we have added to such matrix three further
rows with T columns. The three rows are constant, and filled with −2, 1, 2, respectively.
The resulting matrix θ has then dimension J × T . The parameter J has been set to 1000.
The procedure of generation of the matrix θ leads to the remarkable number of about2
N = JT synthetic agents.
4 Results
Simulations outcomes suggest interesting patterns of variation of the agents’ predictive
ability in variously deteriorated macroeconomic situations.
Tables 1-4 collect the obtained paths of θ in both cases of SB and median forecasters, for
the cases of mild and severe crisis.
2The term ”about” is here properly placed, because actually a negligible number of agents with some
θ = −1 and θ = 0 has been removed, to let functions β’s in (7) be well-defined and to exclude the muthian
case.
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INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
Caption: Values of the θ’s for t = 1, 2, . . . , T and for f0 = −0.025 : 0.003 : −0.001. Case
of mild crisis, second best agents.
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
Caption: Values of the θ’s for t = 1, 2, . . . , T and for f0 = −0.025 : 0.003 : −0.001. Case
of mild crisis, median agents.
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
Caption: Values of the θ’s for t = 1, 2, . . . , T and for f0 = −0.025 : 0.003 : −0.001. Case
of severe crisis, second best agents.
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
Caption: Values of the θ’s for t = 1, 2, . . . , T and for f0 = −0.025 : 0.003 : −0.001. Case
of severe crisis, median agents.
Comparing the asymmetry parameters of our synthetic agents shows that SB agents can
succeed in forecasting as good as muthians. As expected, however, this happens only oc-
casionally and never happens for medians. Thus, our artificial economy is able to reflect
the structural heterogeneity characterizing the real world where different types of agents
inevitably coexist.
Another interesting finding is that the two groups under scrutiny are relatively more similar
during mild economic periods than in more critical cyclical phases (see two illustrative ex-
amples in Figures 2 and 3). This outcome is consistent with the obvious fact that it is easier
to forecast a constant than a volatile fundamental. Otherwise stated, economic stability is
associated to macroeconomic variables with low volatility, which tends to limit the range
of forecasting errors whatever the predictors’ approach or skill. When the forecasting error
is small, no matter whether agents predict optimally or median, the plausible range of the
selected θ’s tend to show small oscillations around zero.
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
Caption: Differences between SB and medians agent’s θ’s in both types of crises. Case
f0 = −0.025.
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
Caption: Differences between SB and medians agent’s θ’s in both types of crises. Case
f0 = −0.001.
A third intriguing finding emerging from our simulations is that the less sophisticated
forecasters’ θ’s tend to be relatively smoother than the second best agents’ ones. This holds
regardless the size of the crisis (see Table 5).
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE
Caption: Difference between the standard deviations w.r.t. t of the θ’s for medians and
SB forecasters. The cases of f0 are distinguished.
Simulations highlight more details. The two groups of sub-optimal agents appear relatively
more similar during mild economic stances, while they behave very differently amid dramatic
economic turmoils. In particular, it seems that deep crises lead second best agents to show
a sort of bang-bang behavior (see Tables 1 and 3). This also implies that, occasionally,
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na¨ıve forecasters can outperform SB ones. We interpret this finding as follows. The less-
schizoid behavior of medians mirrors the fact that – by construction – they are less attentive
and have lower information and forecasting ability with respect to SB agents. Accordingly,
medians are relatively less prone or prompt to seek and to include new information and,
hence, to revise their beliefs. One is then tempted to say that median forecasters follow a
more ”conservative behavior” than SB forecasters who, it is worth recalling, seek to mimic
as much as possible the Muth-optimal agents’ behavior. In doing that great recessions
induce SB agents to commit larger errors. The reason for this is twofold. First, economic
turbulence tends to enlarge muthians’ forecasting errors. In turn, this induces greater biases
in SB forecasters. Second, for reasons such as greater mass media coverage, major crises
broaden the available information set. Thus, unlike the inattentive medians, SB agents
revise their forecasts because they quickly exploit any new information. The problem with
the SB promptness is that, as emphasized by Doms and Morin (2004), the media tends
to emphasize bad economic news. Consequently, as argued by Blendon et al. (1997), the
public’s biases can be attributed to the media’s focus on bad news (see also Bovi, 2009).
On this topic, many years ago Simon (1971) noted that a wealth of information creates
a poverty of attention. Summarizing, the simple availability of more information neither
necessarily mean better information nor better forecasting performances. All in all, our
simulations suggest a rewording of Ackoff’s famous phrase: it is not silly to not look for an
optimal solution to a mess (Ackoff, 1977).
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper has dealt with the effects of bad economic periods on the expectation formation
process (EFP) of different kinds of forecasters, characterized by heterogeneous predictive
ability. The basic idea is that expectations are a key factor in economics and that people
behave differently. Just to mention, there are quite significant and well-known incentives
to become a sport champion or to win a Nobel Prize, yet very few persons succeed in the
endeavor. The brutal truth is that the majority lags behind or gives up. By the same
token lay forecasters may learn, but it is unrealistic to think that all of them – even in the
long run – will achieve Muth-optimal and, hence, homogeneous forecasts. Studying infla-
tion expectations, some authors (Ranyard et al. 2008, Armantier et al. 2013) have found
that lay individuals tend to form more heterogeneous predictions than those of professional
forecasters. Other authors have then argued that individuals use information derived from
their personal experience as consumers, which can be both diverse and inaccurate (Bruine
de Bruin et al. 2011, Madeira and Zafar, 2013). The foregoing leads to confirm that people’s
performances are structurally different. The situation is made even more complex – and
more interesting to study – when the fundamental to predict, the real GDP growth rate, is
well below zero and highly volatile.
This paper may be though of as complementing two strands of the literature. First, accord-
ing to the rational expectations hypothesis all agents use the ”true” model and homogeneous
expectations naturally arise. This said, the new evidence on the limitations of the rational
expectations hypothesis has led researchers to reexamine the process of expectation for-
mation and its implications for macroeconomic models. The adaptive learning approach
(Evans and Honkapohja, 2001) assumes that agents are boundedly rational, but as smart as
econometricians. In our setting, econometricians may be easily classified as SB forecaster.
Accordingly agents – who know the correct model of the economy but do not know the pa-
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rameters – in order to produce forecasts infer parameters as any econometrician would do
– by relentlessly estimating the model. Bounded rationality has also been imposed in other
forms and one may say that three main sources of heterogeneity have been documented:
agents produce heterogeneous forecasts because i) they are using different models, ii) they
have different information sets, and iii) they have differing levels of capacity to process in-
formation. Typically, these approaches assume that – at least in the long-run – differences
among agents should diminish, eventually resulting in identical forecasts. In this respect,
our model and findings suggest a different perspective. In particular, we model structural
heterogeneity taking advantage of three approaches elaborated to study the EFP, namely,
Muth-rational expectations, adaptive learning, and heuristics and biases.
Second, this paper contributes to the literature by examining the effects of macroeconomic
dynamics on the EFP via asymmetric loss functions. Somewhat in line with our results, a
number of authors (Elliott, et al. 2005; Capistran and Timmermann, 2009; Clements, 2009,
2014) has shown that disagreement in expectations varies systematically over time in a
way that reflects the level and variance of the macroeconomic fundamental under scrutiny.
Side-by-side with the use of a macroeconomic fundamental and of the LINEX, we have
taken advantage of this literature even in our choice to examine a T -step ahead forecast
horizon. On the other hand, T -step ahead forecasts are very common both in macroe-
conomic practice and in econometric analysis. We depart from this literature in having
adopted methodological tools grounded in the operational research theory. Specifically, we
have developed a dynamic stochastic optimization problem.
Monte Carlo simulations have shown intriguing patterns, shedding some light on how the
asymmetry parameters – i.e. the agents’ predictive ability – vary according to how serious
the crisis is. The less sophisticated forecasters in our setting – i.e.: the medians – never
perform as muthians and SB agents do that only occasionally. This regardless of the size
of the crisis. This aspect correctly reflects the real world. Differently from the above men-
tioned literature, in our artificial economy heterogeneity is thus a structural trait. Even
more intriguingly, simulations also show that the behavior of medians tends to be relatively
smoother than that of SB agents, and that the difference between them during major crises.
In particular, great recessions lead SB agents’ predictions to be relatively more biased. An
explanation is that dramatic crises broaden the available information set (e.g., due to greater
mass media coverage), leading second-best agents, who are more attentive than medians,
to revise their forecasts. The problem is that more information does not necessarily lead
to better forecasting performances. In general, as stressed by Simon (1971) a wealth of
information creates a poverty of attention. The problem is compounded by the fact that,
as suggested by the literature on rational inattention (Reis, 2006, 2009), decision-makers
have a limited amount of attention available and have to decide how to allocate it. This
limitation may lead to a rational inattention that is somewhat in line with our outcomes.
All considered, this paper supports a rewording of Ackoff’s famous phrase: it is not silly to
not look for an optimal solution to a mess.
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Appendix
We present the numerical procedures in a block-wise form.
First block
The first building block of consists of the generation of the dynamics of agents’ GDP forecast
{f˜t}t in (1).
(A.1) set j = 1;
(A.2) set t = 1;
(A.3) set f˜j,t = f˜0;
(A.4) set t = t+ 1 and go to step (A.5);
(A.5) if t = T + 1, go to step (A.7). Otherwise, go to step (A.6);
(A.6) set f˜j,t = f˜j,t−1 + ρ/(1 + θ(j, t)) ∗ f˜j,t−1 and go to step (A.4);
(A.7) set j = j + 1 and go to step (A.8);
(A.8) if j = J + 1, stop. Otherwise, go to step (A.2).
Indices t = 1, . . . , T and j = 1, . . . , J represent time and the components of the vectors θt,
for each t.
Second block
In the second building block of the application, the stochastic dynamics of the true GDP
{ft}t is constructed. In particular, H = 1, 000 scenarios are simulated by extracting H =
1, 000 times the standard normal variable ² in equation (3). The values of α are also
considered.
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(B.1) set a = 1;
(B.2) set h = 1;
(B.3) set t = 1;
(B.4) set ft,h,a = f0;
(B.5) set t = t+ 1 and go to step (B.6);
(B.6) if t = T + 1, go to step (B.8). Otherwise, go to step (B.7);
(B.7) set ft,h,a = ft−1,h,a + ρ ∗ ft−1,h,a + σ(a) ∗ ft−1,h,a ∗Nh(0, 1) and go to step (B.5);
(B.8) set h = h+ 1 and go to step (B.9);
(B.9) if h = H + 1, go to step (B.10). Otherwise, go to step (B.3);
(B.10) set a = a+ 1 and go to step (B.11);
(B.11) if a = 3, stop. Otherwise, go to step (B.2).
Indices h = 1, . . . , H and a = 1, 2 point to the random scenarios and to the intensity of the
crisis, respectively. In particular, a = 1, 2 stand for α = αm, αd, respectively.
In accord to the setting of the problem, function σ(a) introduced in step (B.7) is such that
σ(1) = 0.01, σ(2) = 0.4.
Nh(0, 1) is the adopted notation for the standard normal variable, which is extracted in
correspondence of the values of index h.
Third block
The third block aims at constructing the dynamics of the errors {xt}t as in formula (4).
(C.1) set j = 1;
(C.2) set a = 1;
(C.3) set h = 1;
(C.4) set t = 1;
(C.5) set xj,t,h,a = 0;
(C.6) set t = t+ 1 and go to step (C.7);
(C.7) if t = T + 1, go to step (C.9). Otherwise, go to step (C.8);
(C.8) set xj,t,h,a = ft,h,a − f˜(j, t) and go to step (C.6);
(C.9) set h = h+ 1 and go to step (C.10);
(C.10) if h = H + 1, go to step (C.11). Otherwise, go to step (C.4);
(C.11) set a = a+ 1 and go to step (C.12);
(C.12) if a = 3, go to step (C.13). Otherwise, go to step (C.3);
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(C.13) set j = j + 1 and go to step (C.14);
(C.14) if j = J + 1, stop. Otherwise, go to step (C.2).
By using the definition of the loss function L in (5) and the quantities θ(j, t) and xj,t,h,a
introduced in the previous steps of the numerical procedure, we have obtained a J×T×H×2
matrix L˜ = (L˜j,t,h,a)j,t,h,a as follows:
Lj,t,h,a =
∣∣∣ 1
θ(j, t)2
∗ [exp((θ(j, t)) ∗ xj,t,h,a)− θ(j, t) ∗ xj,t,h,a − 1]− (xj,t,h,a)2
∣∣∣.
Recalling that the index h is associated to the simulated scenarios, we have then taken the
average on h and obtain the matrix L = (Lj,t,a)j,t,a:
Lj,t,a =
1
H
H∑
h=1
L˜j,t,h,a.
The cases a = 1 and a = 2 have been distinguished. Fixed a = a¯, the median and the
second best forecaster have been identified as follows:
• Median forecaster
For each t¯ = 1, 2, . . . , T , we have taken the median of (Lj,t¯,a¯)j , say for j = j?t¯ , and identi-
fied the corresponding θ(j?t¯ , t¯). When the number of the data is pair, the median do not
correspond to any θ . In this case, we have sorted (Lj,t¯,a¯)j in increasing order and found
the index j¯t¯ such that the median of (Lj,t¯,a¯)j is 1/2(Lj¯t¯−1,t¯,a¯ + Lj¯t¯,t¯,a¯). We have then set
j?t¯ = j¯t¯, hence leading to θ(j
?
t¯ , t¯) = θ(j¯t¯, t¯).
The trajectory of the θ related to the median forecaster is
θmedian = (θ(j?1 , 1), θ(j
?
2 , 2), . . . , θ(j
?
T , T )).
• Second best forecaster
For each t¯ = 1, 2, . . . , T , we have taken the minimum over j of (Lj,t¯,a¯)j , which is assumed
to be attained for j = j•¯t , and identified the corresponding θ(j
•¯
t , t¯).
The trajectory of the θ related to the second best forecaster is
θsb = (θ(j•1 , 1), θ(j
•
2 , 2), . . . , θ(j
•
T , T )).
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